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Against Jürgen Habermas, Chantal Mouffe insists that there is no
necessary conceptual relation between democracy and human rights
but only a contingent historical relation. Moreover, these principles
are fundamentally irreconcilable: while democracy presupposes an
historical act of exclusion in the political constitution of a demos,
human rights presupposes a universally inclusive moral community.
Yet, Mouffe argues, the accommodation of these conflicting legit imat-
ing principles within a liberal democratic regime is productive.
Although irreconcilable, their paradoxical articulation keeps the
limits that enable democratic deliberation and decision-making in
view for being political and, therefore, contestable. Radical democ-
racy, she argues, is premised on the recognition and affirmation of this
‘democratic paradox’.1
In this chapter I examine whether a commitment to radical democ-
racy requires that we affirm Mouffe’s account of the democratic
paradox. Might one be a radical democrat and yet understand human
rights and popular sovereignty to be co-original as Habermas does?
Specifically, I want to consider what is at stake politically in concep-
tualising the relation between these two legitimating principles of
modern regimes. I will suggest that what is at stake is the representa-
tion of political claims. To understand human rights and democracy
as ‘co-original’ in the way that Habermas proposes is to peremptorily
exclude radical political speech and action that would fundamentally
contest the terms of political association. For it diminishes the repre-
sentational space in which a claim could be articulated that would
contest the particular determination of the ‘we’ that authorises that
order in the first place.
Mouffe’s Schmittian thematisation of the political brings this ide-
ological aspect of the co-originality thesis into view. First, because it
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draws attention to the way in which Habermas posits the contingent
and particular determination of political unity as a necessary condi-
tion for the universalising operation of law so that the demos, as
socially determined, becomes a given within the field of instituted pol-
itics. Second, because it reveals how Habermas’s characterisation of
law as an enabling condition for politics means that social conflict is
represented as already internal to the political unity that it necessar-
ily presupposes. In other words, positing human rights and popular
sovereignty as co-original removes the question of the determination
of the ‘self’ of the demos from politics. This leads to a certain polic-
ing of the agon since only communal conflict can be recognised as
legitimate.
I agree with Mouffe, then, that radical democrats ought to recog-
nise the relation between human rights and popular sovereignty as
paradoxically articulated. However, I also want to suggest that a
fuller account of the democratic paradox is required than is afforded
by a Schmittian conception of the political. Indeed, to identify democ-
racy with an exclusive political identification and human rights with
an inclusive moral cosmopolitanism, as Mouffe (following Schmitt)
does, is to remain caught within the terms of liberal ideology. With
Habermas, then, I concur that both popular sovereignty and human
rights are ‘janus-faced’ since each principle has both a determinate
institutional dimension (that orders ordinary politics) and a symbolic,
quasi-transcendent dimension (that potentially politicises a social
order). A radical conception of democracy requires that we affirm this
symbolic (and, indeed, ‘quasi-transcendent’) aspect of the political
rather than privileging its institutional determination.
Unpopular sovereignty2 and political paradox
Rousseau is usually credited as the first political theorist to identify
the democratic paradox in drawing a distinction between the general
will and the will of all. Rousseau’s point is that, while popular sover-
eignty means that what the people wills is right, it does not follow
from this that the people has a right to will what is wrong. Rather, a
people, by definition, always wills ‘generally’. Whereas the ‘will of all’
refers to a simple aggregation of subjective wills, the formation of a
general will involves the universalisation of these particular wills in
relation to what is good for all (Rousseau 1997: II.3). The general will
is good because it is public in the twofold sense of both appearing to
all and being shared in common. In other words, the general will is
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good not just because a set of particular interests happens to coalesce
around it but part of its being good is that it is publicly constituted by
free and equal citizens. In Charles Taylor’s (1995) terms, it is an ‘irre-
ducibly social good’.
As such, the social contract is not merely an agreement among
private persons to collectively secure the conditions that best secure
their mutual interests. Rather, it purports to describe how a set of
determinate individuals come to recognise the general will and thus to
think of themselves politically, as collectively intending the universal
law that binds them together. Although, in fact, society is divided
according to conflicting interests, wills, opinions, beliefs and identities,
the representation of this conflict as internal to society presupposes an
original (counter-factual) consensus on the founding law that unifies
the polity. The political paradox emerges in Rousseau’s attempt to
conceptualise this original consensus, which would explain how those
subject to the law might also view themselves as its co-authors (1997:
II.6). If, as Rousseau supposes, law is a pre-condition for civil society
and, hence, for political co-operation, how could an original consen-
sus about the foundation of the law be possible in a state of nature?
Rousseau famously describes the paradox as follows:
For a nascent people to be capable of appreciating sound maxims of pol-
itics and of following the fundamental rules of reason of State, the effect
would have to become the cause, the social spirit which is to be the work
of the institution would have to preside over the institution itself, and men
would have to be prior to the laws what they ought to become by means
of them. (1997: II.7)
Prior to the law there is only a multitude; only with the institution of a
law that would regulate their life in common, identifying each natural
person in the abstract as a free and equal member of the legal associ -
ation, does a people appear on the political scene. But how could a
‘blind multitude’ be capable of founding the law that brings the people
into being (Rousseau 1997: II.6; see Keenan 2003; Honig 2007)?
Of course, Rousseau’s philosophical paradox need not be debili-
tating for political action. Indeed, it is vividly revealed in the revolu-
tionary Declaration of Independence: ‘We hold these truths to be
self-evident’. As Arendt observes, this declaration combines the nec-
essary truth of (self-evident) human rights with a contingent agree-
ment (the fact of their being declared and the imputation of this
declaration to a collective author, the people). Moreover, it reveals
that ‘those who would get together to constitute a new government
the politics of radical democracy
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are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do
what they set out to achieve’ (Arendt 1991: 183–4). In the revolu-
tionary moment, the will of the people lacks an institutional frame-
work in terms of which it may be represented as such. As Bert van
Roermund puts it, ‘the people’ who are supposed to be sovereign in a
democratic polity are both inside and outside the legal order that is
constituted; political power both institutes a new legal order while the
newly instituted legal order is supposed to enable and restrain that
very ‘political power’ (2003: 38). The democratic paradox here
emerges in the circular relation between the constituent power and
the constituted power, between the sovereign subject that founds the
law and the law that delimits a space for politics within which the sov-
ereign will can be expressed.
In his later work, Habermas has sought to resolve the democratic
paradox by appealing to discourse ethics. Far from being potentially
contradictory, he argues, the principles of popular sovereignty and rule
of law necessarily presuppose each other in the self-understanding of
a democratic society. Any apparent contradiction between these two
principles of legitimacy could be resolved by recourse to the meta-
political presupposition of the democratic enterprise: namely, that
since self-determination is an act of co-legislation those engaged in this
task must already implicitly recognise each other as legal persons
(hence individual rights-holders).
To think through what is at stake politically in the conceptualisa-
tion of the democratic paradox, I want to keep before us the situ ation
of indigenous people, their unpopular assertion of sovereignty and
the representational space afforded to this claim within the actually
existing democracy of Australia. In a national referendum in 1967,
90 per cent of Australians voted in favour of amending the constitu-
tion to include Aborigines in the census count and to allow the
Federal Government the power over Aboriginal affairs, which had
previously been reserved for State government. This has been com-
memorated in Australia as the moment in which Aborigines achieved
citizenship rights. Yet, indigenous activist Kevin Gilbert objects that
Aborigines ‘never voted to be incorporated with non-Aboriginals.
Australian citizenship was imposed on us unilaterally’(1993: 41). At
stake in the political conflict between the settler society and indige-
nous people is precisely the sovereignty of the people, the terms of
inclusion in the demos.
In this context, the (counter-factual) presupposition that indigen -
ous people should be able to view themselves as co-authors of the law
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with non-indigenous people risks perpetuating the logic of internal
colonisation. As James Tully explains, with internal colonisation the
land, resources and jurisdiction of indigenous people are appropri-
ated not only for the sake of exploitation but for the ‘territorial foun-
dation of the dominant society itself’ (2000: 39). While liberation
from external colonisation is possible by forcing the withdrawal of
the occupying imperial power, such tactics of direct confrontation are
ineffective in the context of internal colonisation in which ‘the dom-
inant society coexists on and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the
territories and jurisdictions that the indigenous peoples refuse to sur-
render’. Both the colonisers and colonised, therefore, view the system
of internal colonisation as a temporary means to an end. Indigenous
people would resolve this irresolution by ‘regaining their freedom as
self-governing peoples’. In contrast, the settler society would resolve
the irresolution by the ‘complete disappearance of the indigenous
problem, that is, the disappearance of indigenous people as free
peoples with the right to their territories and governments’ (Tully
2000: 40; cf. Ivanitz 2002).
On 26 January 1972, four young Aboriginal men (Billie Craig, Bert
Williams, Michael Anderson and Tony Correy) planted a beach
umbrella on the lawn of Parliament House in Canberra. In doing so,
they claimed to establish an embassy to the Australian state on behalf
of the Aboriginal people(s) within its territory. The delegation insisted
that, since they were effectively aliens in their own land, indigenous
people needed an embassy like other aliens in this country. Since its
foundation, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy has been a focal point of
political struggle by indigenous people in Australia (see Waterford
1992; Robinson 1994; Dow 2000; Foley 2002). In Arendt’s terms
(above), the tent ambassadors were unconstitutional: they had no
authority to do what they set out to achieve. They were authorised
neither by the Australian constitution (which positions them as co-
authors of the law together with members of the settler society) nor by
the sovereign Aboriginal nation that they claimed to represent. In both
instances, such authorisation would only be possible retrospectively.3
The tent embassy invokes Aboriginal sovereignty as a right while
testifying to the lack of sovereignty in fact. On the one hand, the
embassy has the symbolic trappings of sovereignty: it flies its own flag
and it claims the right to negotiate with the Australian state as the rep-
resentative of a sovereign people. It is this assertion of Aboriginal sov-
ereignty that representatives of the Australian state have found
troubling. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in 1972 said that the
the politics of radical democracy
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notion of an Aboriginal ‘embassy’ had a disturbing undertone since
‘the term implied a sovereign state and cut across the Government’s
expressed objection to separate development’. This attitude has pre-
vailed in the present government in relation to calls for a treaty
between settlers and indigenous people. While in opposition, for
instance, the former Prime Minister John Howard remarked that ‘it
is an absurd proposition that a nation should make a treaty with some
of its own citizens’ (cited in Patton 2001: 37).
On the other hand, the embassy is a tent rather than a permanent
building. Resembling the fringe dweller camps of rural Australian
towns, the tent embassy also symbolises the dispossession of indige-
nous people, their lack of sovereignty over their lands. This aspect of
the embassy has equally troubled politicians who have frequently
described it as an ‘eyesore’. There have been several attempts by gov-
ernments over the years to clean up the lawns of Parliament by offer-
ing to provide permanent meeting rooms, memorial plaques or
reconciliation paths in exchange for the removal of the tent embassy.
Following a review undertaken by the consulting firm Mutual
Mediations in 2005, the Federal Government announced that the tent
embassy will be replaced with a more permanent structure. A sign
declaring ‘No Camping’ has been erected at the embassy, although the
Minister gave an assurance that no residents will be removed against
their will.
I want to consider what critical work Habermas’s co-originality
thesis and Mouffe’s democratic paradox do for conceptualising
indigenous people’s unpopular claim to sovereignty on its own terms.
To what extent are these frameworks adequate to understanding
Aboriginal sovereignty as anything more than an ‘absurd propos -
ition’? Although recognised as citizens by the Australian state, it
would be plainly difficult for indigenous people in Australia to regard
themselves as authors of the law of this country. On the face of it,
however, this would not invalidate Habermas’s conceptualisation of
the relation between democracy and rights. The question is whether
indigenous peoples’ struggle against colonisation can be adequately
represented within the terms of Habermas’s conceptual framework.
Can indigenous peoples’ objection to colonisation be accommodated
in a demand to be recognised as free and equal participants in the leg-
islative process? Or does the normative representation of indige-
nous and settler peoples as co-authors of the law lead to a certain
co-optation of the insurrectionary political act of ‘establishing’ an
Aboriginal embassy?
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Mouffe’s characterisation of the democratic paradox
Against Habermas, Chantal Mouffe asserts that there is ‘no necessary
relation’ between human rights and popular sovereignty but ‘only a
contingent historical articulation’ (2000: 3). In fact, these principles
have distinct logics, which often come into conflict at the conceptual
as well as the practical level. As is well known, Mouffe draws on Carl
Schmitt to describe the opposing logics of human rights and popular
sovereignty. Schmitt’s work is attractive to radical democrats, such as
Chantal Mouffe and Andreas Kalyvas (2005), because he insists on
the primacy of politics over the rule of law, arguing against Hans
Kelsen that ‘the concrete existence of the politically unified people is
prior to every norm’ (cited in Lindahl 2007: 9). In a constitutional
democracy there is a fundamental antagonism between its political
aspect (at bottom a decision about the form the political unity will
take) and its legal aspect (which imposes restrictions on political
activity).
Appropriating Schmitt’s interpretation of constitutional democ-
racy, Mouffe (1993, 2000) argues that the democratic paradox arises
from the fact that the exercise of popular sovereignty requires the
delimitation of a demos, which necessarily excludes non-members in
the act of including its members. This brings popular sovereignty into
conflict with the universalism of human rights discourse. Stated in this
way, the democratic paradox comes about because of the different
constituencies to which popular sovereignty and human rights refer.
Popular sovereignty refers to a political community: a concrete his-
torical community that is necessarily bounded. In contrast, human
rights refer to the moral community: an unlimited community that
includes all humanity. Popular sovereignty is predicated on the sub-
stantive equality of citizens because it concerns, in Rawlsian terms,
the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-operation.
Human rights, in contrast, are predicated on the formal equality of
moral persons because they rely on the ideal of human dignity and the
categorical imperative (Mouffe 2000: 40–4).
Mouffe argues that in order to sustain robust liberal democratic
institutions we need to acknowledge and affirm the democratic
paradox (2000: 4). The tension between the principles of popular sov-
ereignty and human rights cannot be philosophically resolved. They
can only be negotiated politically – ‘temporarily stabilised’ in a way
that establishes the hegemony of one principle over the other (Mouffe
2000: 5, 45). In other words, in certain periods liberal rights will take
the politics of radical democracy
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priority over popular sovereignty. At other times popular sovereignty
will take priority over liberal rights according to the contingencies of
social and political power, the outcome of the struggle between left
and right.
But far from being a weakness, Mouffe insists, the paradoxical
articulation of human rights and popular sovereignty is the strength
of the liberal democratic regime:
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied by
the political constitution of ‘the people’ – required by the exercise of
democracy – the liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an
important role in maintaining the democratic contestation alive. On the
other side, it is only thanks to the democratic logics of equivalence that
frontiers can be created and a demos established without which no real
exercise of rights could be possible. (Mouffe 2000: 10)
Mouffe is here in agreement with Schmitt in according a certain
 priority to the political (understood as the determination of the
 commonality of political community in terms of a relation of inclu-
sion/exclusion) over the instantiation of a universalising normative
order that it makes possible. In the absence of their declaration
or enactment within political community, human rights are without
value since, in Habermas’s terms, they lack ‘facticity’ in being socially
recognised and enforceable. Against Schmitt, however, instead of
viewing human rights as an ‘unpolitical’ limit to politics, Mouffe
understands human rights as having a politicising role within the
democratic polity. For Schmitt, liberal human rights could only ever
amount to an inauthentic politics: a polemical discourse that dis-
avows its own politics in the sense of favouring one form of political
community over another. In contrast, Mouffe sees human rights as
potentially enabling a legitimate contest within the political associa-
tion over the terms of belonging. Although the distinction between
citizen and non-citizen is the fundamental political distinction (which
would contain all other political conflicts), the appeal to human rights
enables an ‘agonistic’ politics within the democratic polity by bring-
ing into view the contingency of that founding distinction and hence
the possibility that it might be drawn otherwise.
Mouffe argues that Habermas’s search for a conceptual resolution
of this paradoxical articulation of popular sovereignty and human
rights is misguided because it puts ‘undue constraints on the political
debate’ (Mouffe 2000: 93; see also Mouffe 2005a: 83–9). Why?
Because Habermas seeks to resolve the relation between these two
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legitimating principles meta-politically rather than recognising this as
an issue that can only be settled politically in a particular institutional
setting. Mouffe accepts that some limits must be placed on democra-
tic politics in order to make possible the kind of agonistic engagement
that she favours. However, she insists, ‘the political nature of the
limits should be acknowledged instead of being presented as require-
ments of morality or rationality’ (Mouffe 2000: 93). Mouffe’s objec-
tion to determining the limits of democratic politics according to
moral or rational standards is the same as Schmitt’s  critique of liber-
alism. Namely, that the appeal to supposedly meta-political criteria to
set the boundaries of institutional politics is always disingenuous; it
leads to an ‘anti-political’ politics, a denial of the political nature of
one’s own discourse, which is, in fact, a particularly intensive way of
pursuing politics.
As Emilios Christodoulidis notes, the significance of the Schmittian
conception of the political for radical politics is that it ‘imports a
reflexivity into politics, in the sense that the origin of political action
is already political: it resides in the contingency of the recognition of
what constitutes a political unity in the first place’ (2007: 192).
Radical politics thrives on the recognition of contingency since that is
the basis of politicisation, opening the possibility that this unity might
be constituted otherwise.
In this context, however, Christodoulidis draws an important dis-
tinction between the ‘abstract conceptualisation’ of the political and
its ‘concrete manifestations’. If, in its abstract conceptualisation, the
political is the ‘dimension of antagonism which [is] constitutive of
human societies’ (Mouffe 2005a: 9), its concrete manifestation would
be the particular distinction that delimits the terms of belonging in
this political association. The importance of differentiating these two
levels of the political (i.e. between its abstract conceptualisation and
concrete manifestations) is to show that the concrete manifestation
could always be otherwise. Moreover, the abstract conceptualisation
of the political is itself, to some extent, also contingent: what is inte-
gral to the concept of the political is that it refers to the institution of
society. Whether this is brought about through antagonism or other-
wise is also a matter of politics.
Habermas’s co-originality thesis
In arguing that popular sovereignty and human rights are ‘co-original’
or ‘equiprimordial’, Habermas means that neither principle takes
the politics of radical democracy
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 priority in the philosophical order of justification. As such, he wants
to show that the basic idea of human rights – that everyone has a fun-
damental right to equal individual liberties – should not be understood
as a pre-political moral constraint on the sovereign legislator, as in
 liberalism. Nor should it be understood only instrumentally as an
enabling condition for democratic expression, as in republicanism.
Rather, the twin principles of popular sovereignty and human rights,
on which the legitimacy of law depends, presuppose each other. The
co-originality of popular sovereignty and the rule of law (as guaran-
teed by human rights) is expressed in the ideal of self-legislation: ‘that
those subject to law as its addressees can at the same time understand
themselves as authors of the law’ (Habermas 1996: 104). We are the
addressees of the law in our role as private persons or rights-bearers
whereas we are authors of the law in our role as citizens or ‘co-
 legislators’ (see Baynes 1995; Scheurman 1999; Maus 2002).
The first step in Habermas’s argument is to insist, against Marx,
on the inter-subjective basis of human rights. Habermas acknowl-
edges that these subjective rights delimit the legitimate scope within
which individuals may exercise free choice, regardless of their moral
motivation. In the well-established liberal parlance, rights aim to
maximise the liberty of each individual compatible with the same
enjoyment of liberty by others. As such, rights free individuals to
strategically pursue their private interests without regard for the
common good. Or, in Habermas’s terms, rights entitle individuals to
‘drop out of communicative action’ insofar as the ‘legal subject does
not have to give . . . publicly acceptable reasons for her action plans’
(1996: 120). But rather than viewing rights as thereby institutionalis-
ing an amoral possessive individualism, Habermas describes the
‘moral unburdening’ of individuals as a functional achievement of
legal rights, which complements morality (1996: 114–18). In their
relation to the law as addressees, he argues, law unburdens individu-
als from the unprecedented cognitive, motivational and organisa-
tional demands of moral judgement and action in a complex society.
While freeing individuals for competitive and self-interested behav-
iour, however, human rights do not necessarily presuppose an atom-
istic conception of society, as the radical tradition has often charged.
On the contrary, they are a form of social co-operation: ‘as elements
of the legal order they presuppose collaboration among subjects who
recognise one another, in their reciprocally related rights and duties,
as free and equal citizens’ (Habermas 1996: 89). The inter-subjective
foundation of rights – their status as norms shared by members of a
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legal community – points the way to the principle of popular sover-
eignty in terms of which they are enacted as law.
The second step in Habermas’s argument is to claim that the ‘legal
medium as such presupposes rights that define the status of legal
persons as bearers of rights’ (Habermas 1996: 119). The primordial
human right of each individual to equal subjective liberties is a foun-
dational principle of law such that a legitimate legal code cannot exist
without a system of rights: the subject of law is, by definition, a rights-
holder. Importantly, Habermas understands human rights only in
juridical terms (1996: 105). He rejects the natural law tradition,
according to which individuals possess pre-political moral rights in
the state of nature, which are recognised in positive law when they
enter into a social contract together. Rights do not exist in a determi-
nate form in the state of nature but are mutually conferred when
 individuals undertake to regulate their life in common through the
medium of law.
This brings us to Habermas’s third step. Stated bluntly, popular
sovereignty can only be exercised through the medium of law and,
since the general right to liberties is constitutive of the legal form as
such, the recognition of human rights is a necessary presupposition of
democratic praxis. Insofar as the exercise of popular sovereignty
requires individuals to reach an understanding on the basic principles
according to which they should regulate their collective life, they view
each other as co-legislators. Yet, in employing the medium of law,
they must already recognise each other as legal subjects and therefore
entitled to equal subjective liberties. In a striking formulation,
Habermas insists:
. . . the medium through which citizens exercise their autonomy is not a
matter of choice. Citizens participate in legislation only as legal subjects;
it is no longer in their power to decide which language they will make use
of. (2002: 201)
Importantly, the medium of law does not presuppose any substantive
human rights. Rather rights are present in the form of law only as
‘unsaturated placeholders’ for the specification of particular rights
that are to be given substance through the exercise of political auton-
omy (Habermas 1996: 125).
In reconstructing the logical genesis of rights in this way, Habermas
claims to have established a necessary conceptual relation between
popular sovereignty and human rights in contrast to Mouffe’s insis-
tence on a contingent historical relation. This necessary connection
the politics of radical democracy
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works in both directions to establish that the private autonomy of
legal persons and the public autonomy of citizens mutually presup-
pose each other. On the one hand, human rights necessarily presup-
pose popular sovereignty to the extent that individuals can ‘realise
equality in the enjoyment of their private autonomy only if they make
appropriate use of their political autonomy as citizens’ (Habermas
2002: 202). Although rights are constitutive of the legal form, legal-
ity as such cannot ground any specific right. Rather, a system of rights
can only be developed when the legal form is used to exercise popular
sovereignty, i.e. when citizens exercise their right to submit only to
those norms they could agree to in discourse. On the other hand,
popular sovereignty presupposes human rights since individuals are
only free to engage in democratic praxis to the extent that their inde-
pendence from each other is guaranteed through the equal protection
of their private freedoms, i.e. those rights that protect private goods
(such as property, freedom of religious worship) thereby assuring the
independence of civil society from the state.
It is no coincidence that Habermas’s argument in support of the co-
originality thesis bears a striking resemblance to the argument he
makes to arrive at his discourse principle. As is well known,
Habermas argues that certain validity-claims – to truth, sincerity and
rightness – are necessarily presupposed in all communicative acts. As
ideal conditions necessarily presupposed in factual communication
these principles require no justification. Moreover, the fact that they
are presupposed by language gives universal morality an immanent
purchase within particular forms of life.
The structure of this argument is mirrored in Habermas’s claim
that human rights are a necessary presupposition of the legal medium
through which democratic self-determination is enacted (Habermas
1996: 127). As a necessary condition of the legal form as such, the
basic human right to equal liberty similarly requires no justification
(Habermas 1996: 112). Moreover, like the presuppositions of the
ideal speech situation, the presupposition of the basic human right in
the legal form gives universal morality an immanent purchase within
the historical project of democratic self- determination by a particular
legal community.
As such, Habermas acknowledges the tension Mouffe identifies
between the necessarily limited political community in which rights
are articulated and enforced on the one hand and the unlimited moral
community to which universal rights refer on the other. However,
rather than presenting this tension as an external one between the
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contending traditions of liberal constitutionalism and democratic
 politics as Mouffe does, he recasts this tension as internal to the law
and located in the system of rights itself.
This tension between what Habermas calls ‘facticity’ and ‘validity’
is manifest in positively enacted human rights insofar as their legiti-
macy depends on their guarantee of liberty through coercion: ‘legal
norms are at the same time but in different respects enforceable laws
based on coercion and laws of freedom’ (Habermas 1996: 29). By fac-
ticity, Habermas refers to the decisionistic aspect of the law, its orig-
ination in the will of the sovereign and the fact that compliance with
the law is externally motivated by the threat of sanctions. By validity
Habermas means that the law’s legitimacy does not depend only on
the fact of social acceptance but also on the presupposition that the
law is the outcome of democratic deliberation and decision-making.
When confronted by the law’s facticity we experience it as a con-
straint on our free choice; we obey it out of our self-interest in avoid-
ing legal sanctions. When confronted by its validity, in contrast, we
comply with the law out of respect for it since we presume that it
expresses a rational democratic will-formation among free and equal
citizens.
The tension between facticity and validity inherent in law enables
Habermas to deal with Marx’s (1987) critique that human rights alien-
ate men and women from their species being – that in a liberal democ-
racy they live a ‘double life’ between their heavenly existence as
communal beings in the state and their earthly existence as egoistic
individuals in civil society. According to Habermas, although those
rights institutionalised by the law unburden individuals from the
requirement of communicative rationality, it leaves them free to take
‘either an objectivating or performative attitude’ to legal norms (1996:
30). As addressees, they can view the law strategically as establishing
constraints on their freedom of choice or they can obey the law out of
respect for it on the presumption that it is rationally acceptable.
Against Marx’s early account of political alienation in terms of the
bifurcation of the subject as concrete particular ‘man’ and abstract
universal ‘citizen’, Habermas insists that the ‘citizens who mutually
grant one another equal rights are one and the same individuals as the
private persons who use rights strategically and encounter one
another as potential opponents’ (1996: 89). The idea of popular sov-
ereignty is thus indispensable for modern law since it provides the
basis on which the law’s claim to validity might be redeemed. While
individuals are free to pursue their self-interest unburdened by the
the politics of radical democracy
64
M1499 - LITTLE TEXT.qxp:GRAHAM Q7  17/9/08  17:00  Page 64
demands of communicative rationality within the constraints set by
human rights, they are simultaneously free to recognise or contest the
inter-subjective agreement on which human rights ultimately rest. By
virtue of their public freedom to contest the validity of the law citi-
zens are able to overcome their potential alienation from it.
According to Habermas, this tension between facticity and valid-
ity is originally present in everyday communicative practice. This is
so because every speech act involves a validity-claim on which the
hearer is free to take a yes/no position. In every speech act there is an
implied promise to redeem our claim if challenged to do so by offer-
ing reasons that our addressee might accept as valid. Because validity
claims implicitly refer to the ‘ideally expanded audience of the unlim-
ited interpretation community’ in relation to which they might be
redeemed, there is an ‘ideal moment of unconditionality . . . ingrained
in factual processes of communication’ (Habermas 1996: 21).
Consequently, every political claim contains both a universal aspect
which transcends the spatial and temporal context in which it is raised
and a particular aspect specific to the political-historical situation that
is at stake in whether it is accepted or rejected. As such validity claims
are ‘janus-faced’. As claims they ‘overshoot every context’. Yet they
‘must be both raised and accepted here and now if they are to support
an agreement effective for co-ordination – for this there is no acon-
textual standpoint’ (Habermas 1996: 21). In the context of a consti-
tutional politics, Habermas’s point seems to be very close to Mouffe’s
when she argues that ‘no real exercise of rights could be possible’ in
the absence of a bounded political community (2000: 10). The
tension between facticity and validity is present in law to the extent
that its validity depends both on the fact of its social acceptance and
the presumption that it is rationally acceptable.
While Habermas barely remarks on it, this tension is particularly
apparent in his reconstruction of the logical genesis of the system of
rights when he refers to the interpenetration of the legal form which
‘stabilises behavioural expectations’ and the discourse principle
according to which the ‘legitimacy of legal norms can be tested’
(Habermas 1996: 122). The discourse principle (D) states that ‘just
those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons
could agree as participants in rational discourses’ (Habermas 1996:
107). By ‘those affected’ Habermas means ‘anyone whose interests
are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice reg-
ulated by the norms at issue’ (1996: 107). While the norms of a legal
order are necessarily expressed as rights, Habermas argues that the
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discourse principle is required to establish the liberal legal principle
that ‘each person is owed a right to the greatest possible measure of
equal liberties that are mutually compatible’ (1996: 123).
However, in order to institutionalise these rights it is necessary to
‘demarcate the bounds of membership and provide legal remedies for
cases of right violations’ (Habermas 1996: 124). In other words,
when the discourse principle interpenetrates with the legal form, we
shift from the universal/cosmopolitan principle of affectedness to the
historical/republican principle of membership in order to determine
the relevant constituency in relation to which the validity-claims of
the law must be redeemed. This limitation of the discourse principle
‘follows simply . . . from the facticity of making and enforcing the
law’ (Habermas 1996: 124).
But while the limitation of the discourse principle certainly follows
from the facticity of making and enforcing law, Habermas elides too
much in passing this concession off as a simple matter. First, because
in losing their reference to natural law, human rights appear to lose
their context-transcending aspect, their ‘ideal moment of uncondi-
tionality’, which was for Mouffe precisely what accorded them
their potentially politicising aspect. In understanding human rights
only in terms of their institutional determination, Habermas risks rel-
egating them to a wholly regulatory function within the democratic
polity. Second, because Habermas’s insistence that democratic self-
 determination can only be exercised through the medium of law tends
to reify the ‘self’ that is to be determining as already constituted
through law. If self-determination can only ever be exercised within
the law then this rules out in advance the possibility of any kind of
radical action, understood in terms of an act of constituent power.
The problem emerges of how the violence that founds the facticity
of the law in delimiting a finite political community could ever be
redressed by the infinite validity that the same legal order is supposed
to carry in its very form – without, that is, this becoming an ideolog-
ical moment (see, for example, Motha 2002). In the context with
which we are concerned, of course, this returns us to the problem of
how indigenous people might come to view themselves as co-authors
of the law to which they were originally subject as colonised.
The ‘absurd proposition’ of Aboriginal sovereignty
We have seen that Habermas does not ignore the tension between
political exclusion and moral inclusion that Mouffe draws our
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 attention to. Rather than representing this tension as an external one
between the principles of popular sovereignty and human rights,
however, he casts it as one internal to law, between its facticity and its
validity. The strength of Habermas’s analysis is that it shows both
human rights and popular sovereignty to be ‘janus-faced’ to the
extent that we seek to realise them within particular contexts. This
suggests that each principle has both an exclusive determinate aspect
and an inclusive symbolic aspect. Yet, we have also seen that
Habermas eludes the political since he passes too lightly over the
exclusive foundation of law as following simply from the need to
make and enforce it.
In other words, Habermas acknowledges but does not adequately
address the ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory (Whelan 1983).
According to his discourse principle: ‘Just those action norms are
valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants
in rational discourses’ (Habermas 1996: 107). But, as Habermas is
aware, the principle of ‘all possibly affected persons’ will not do as a
principle for identifying the relevant constituency for political deci-
sions. This is because there is no democratic way of determining who
all possibly affected persons are in the case of disagreement over
whether particular persons are affected or not. Habermas readily
admits that:
From a normative point of view, the social boundaries of an association
of free and equal consociates under law are perfectly contingent. Since the
voluntariness of the decision to engage in a law-giving praxis is a fiction
of the contractualist tradition, in the real world who gains the power to
define the boundaries of a political community is settled by historical
chance and the actual course of events, normally, by the arbitrary out-
comes of wars or civil wars. (2001: 116; see also 2001: 144)
But there is a deeper conceptual problem with the cosmopolitan prin-
ciple of affectedness which Habermas does not properly address. As
Bert van Roermund observes, in determining those norms according
to which the relevant constituency of the affected is to be decided we
are left with three unsatisfactory options:
Either the answer is simply decided upon (so that the phrase refers to the
normative force of the factual), or it leads to infinite regression (who is to
decide who is to decide . . . etc.), or it is based on petitio principii (who is
involved is decided by who is involved in the first place). (1997: 150)
Habermas seems to opt for the first option, simply presupposing
 community as a legal fact.
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Since Habermas understands human rights in terms of positive law,
the relevant constituency must be defined in territorial terms if his dis-
course principle is to be translated into law. As Habermas acknowl-
edges, as moral norms human rights ‘refer to every creature “that bears
a human face,” but as legal norms they protect individual persons only
insofar as the latter belong to a particular legal community – normally
citizens of a nation-state’ (2001a: 118). Thus, according to Habermas,
the democratic principle, which is derived from his discourse principle,
states that ‘only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with
the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn
has been legally constituted’ (1996: 110). But this is question-begging
since it takes the demos as given rather accounting for how the ‘we’
that authorises the law is generated.
Following from this, Habermas’s view of law as a medium for
democratic expression places undue constraints on political delibera-
tion because it represents social conflict as already internal to the
political community. This is evident, for instance, in the following
 formulation:
Political power is not externally juxtaposed to law but is rather presup-
posed by law and itself established in the form of law. Political power can
develop only through a legal code, and it is, in the legal sense of the word,
constituted in the form of basic rights. (Habermas 1996: 134)
It is certainly true that expressing political claims in terms of rights
often provides a mechanism for translating one’s private preferences
into a publicly justifiable claim. Thus Habermas refers to democratic
procedures as a ‘filter that sorts out issues and contributions, infor-
mation and reasons in such a way that only the relevant and valid
inputs “count”’ (1996: 462). The worry for radical democrats is
whether law filters too much.
Sheldon Wolin, for instance, questions the identification of democ-
racy with constitutionalism, arguing instead for an ‘aconstitutional
conception of democracy’, which he defines as ‘the idea and practice
of rational disorganisation’. On this view democracy is ‘inherently
unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and identified with revolution’
(1994a: 37). The value of Wolin’s work is that it emphasises that
democratic action fundamentally turns around the contestation of the
‘we’ that authorises the law. But whereas politics always refers to this
‘we’ as in the process of becoming, law represents the ‘we’ as always
already (Christodoulidis 2007). To what extent, then, is the medium
of law able to faithfully represent a claim that contests the ‘we’ on
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which its legitimacy depends? Or, to put it another way, to what
extent are radical claims co-opted in being represented as rights-
claims to be adjudicated by reference to the authorising ‘we’ that is
contested in the first place?
In response to this kind of probing, Habermas is forced to fall back
on the principle of implicit consent to hold the place of the counter-
factual consensus: ‘The right to emigrate implies that membership
must rest on an (at least tacit) act of agreement on the member’s part’
(1996: 124–5). But the tacitness of this act of agreement is precisely
what is at stake in fundamental political conflict, which contests the
terms of political association. Having recourse to the principle of tacit
consent in the situation of indigenous people in Australia is clearly
problematic, if not perverse. In cases such as this, the principle of tacit
agreement – which amounts to ‘if you don’t like it you can always
leave’ – appears to rest entirely on the facticity of sovereignty rather
than its validity.
Indeed, to exercise one’s rights as a citizen of Australia, in this
context, might simultaneously be to legitimate the monopoly over the
means of violence assumed by the colonisers. This is why abstention
from voting is a common form of political protest. Similarly, the
recourse to legal remedies that rights make available may contribute
to the further dispossession of a group within a nation-state. This was
spectacularly witnessed, for instance, by the claims brought by indige-
nous peoples to native title in Australia following the Mabo judge-
ment, which effectively provided a legal means of extinguishing
indigenous peoples’ political claims to reparative justice by recourse
to the facticity of sovereignty (see Motha 2002). As Kerruish and
Purdy discuss, in making available the legal identity of ‘native title
claimant/holder’ to indigenous people, Australian property law at the
same time reinscribes the particular determination of the political
unity that is at stake in the conflict between coloniser and colonised,
namely that sovereignty was acquired through settlement rather than
conquest (1998: 152f.). Indeed, it is precisely this presupposition that
the tent ambassadors sought to contest by asserting the right that was
not available to them in Australian law to demand a treaty with the
invaders.
In certain circumstances, then, what Habermas calls the ‘rational-
ising character of the legal form as such’ (1996: 126) can amount to
just that: not an expression of an all-inclusive public reason but a
rationalisation of political exclusion. Habermas acknowledges that
the ‘juridification of communicative freedom also means that the law
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must draw on sources of legitimation that are not at its disposal’
(1996: 131). The question is how this is possible given his insistence
on the co-originality of sovereignty and rights and, hence, of the con-
stituent power as always already framed by the law. When under-
stood as such, how could law account for what is not at its disposal
except on its own terms? How might the extra-legal assertion of
Aboriginal sovereignty register as anything other than an ‘absurd
proposition’?
Would indigenous peoples’ unpopular claim to sovereignty fare
any better when understood in terms of the democratic paradox?
Mouffe’s thematisation of agonistic politics certainly provides a
promising starting point from which to understand the political
conflict between settler and indigenous peoples in Australia. The
advantage of understanding democracy, in this context, in terms of
transforming an antagonistic relation into an agonistic one is that it
resists co-opting the political claims of indigenous peoples by repre-
senting these as already reconcilable with the claims of the settler
society.
As Mouffe puts it, ‘agonism is a we/they relation where the com-
peting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solu-
tion to their conflict, nevertheless recognise the legitimacy of their
opponents’ (1995: 20). The point of agonistic politics, as I understand
it, is that it recognises that politics ultimately concerns the terms
within which social conflict is represented; politics is the struggle to
determine the public good in terms of which one’s interest might be
represented. As already noted, for Mouffe (contra Schmitt), it is the
appeal to human rights that enables this politicisation of the terms of
belonging within the political association. For, as a legitimating prin-
ciple of the regime, human rights provide the ‘shared symbolic space’
that enables the casting of their conflict as ‘social’. And, indeed,
indigenous people have often appealed to indigenous (human) rights
in their struggle for decolonisation.
Yet, as Paul Muldoon (forthcoming) has argued, the conflictual
consensus that Mouffe advocates ends up being limited to a struggle
within the (democratic) political association and consequently
according to the terms of inclusion that it already affords in appeal-
ing to its shared symbolic space. The political limits of democracy
come into view when conflict threatens the existence of the political
association. As Mouffe puts it, ‘in order to be accepted as legitimate
[conflict] needs to take a form that does not destroy the political asso-
ciation’ (Mouffe 2005a: 20). Passages such as this indicate the
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 limitations of the Schmittian conception of the political for a radical
 politics. In my view, a radical politics would precisely be one that
would call into question the concrete manifestation of the political
that delimits the terms of belonging within a particular political asso-
ciation. Indeed, it is precisely this (symbolic) threat that makes the
assertion of Aboriginal sovereignty so unsettling to the settler society
in Australia. Disturbingly, it seems that Aboriginal sovereignty might
also amount to ‘an absurd proposition’ within Mouffe’s framing of
the democratic paradox because she understands the demos (with
Schmitt) in terms of the determinate, concrete manifestation of the
political while neglecting its symbolic, socially indeterminate aspect.
Conclusion
For indigenous people to effectively challenge the terms of their
belonging within Australian society, they would need to be able to
appeal not only to their human rights but to a notion of demos that
would transcend its particular instantiation in the founding of the
settler society. In other words, a radical politics must be able to
contest a democratic regime in the name of democracy: to invoke the
principle of equality in order to contest the exclusions of the demos’s
particular instantiation within a certain social order.4 This, arguably,
was precisely what the tent ambassadors sought to do in claiming a
right (to sovereignty) that was not afforded to them by the liberal
democratic order that they sought to contest. In Jacques Rancière’s
terms, it involved putting two worlds into one (2001: 21). On the one
hand, they enacted their political equality by claiming to speak on
behalf of a sovereign people. On the other hand, they demonstrated
their social inequality as aliens in their own land. In this way, the tent
ambassadors staged a dissensus by showing the world in which
indigenous people are entitled to be addressed as a sovereign people
and the world in which this sovereignty is in fact denied to be one and
the same democracy that they share with their former colonisers.
Notes
1. Thanks to Keith Breen, Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd for their
 comments on an earlier draft of this chapter as well as to participants in
workshops held in Melbourne and Florence in 2006.
2. I borrow this term from Bert van Roermund (2003) who uses it in a
 different but related context.
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3. Indeed, this retrospective authorisation was arguably granted to the tent
ambassadors by indigenous people. Despite the Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs’ claim that the ‘campers’ were unrepresentative militants, they
were accorded full speaking and voting rights at a conference he con-
vened of government-selected representatives of Aboriginal communi-
ties in October 1972. The conference passed a motion in support of the
embassy, calling for it to be reinstated following its removal by police
earlier that year.
4. In this regard, the recent work of Jacques Rancière (2004) is promising.
See Schaap (forthcoming).
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